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I. INTRODUCTION
O N AUGUST 13, 2013, the Antitrust Division of the U.S. De-partment of Justice (DOJ) filed a complaint in the District
of Columbia district court alleging that the proposed merger of
American Airlines' parent company, AMR Corporation, and US
Airways Group violated the Clayton Act's prohibition of activity
that "would substantially lessen competition."' This action sur-
prised executives of the firms2 and garnered mixed reactions
from DOJ alumni.
After three months of litigation, the parties reached a pro-
posed settlementjust a few days before the scheduled trial date.4
The terms of the settlement required the merged entity to divest
certain assets that, in the opinion of the DOJ, would increase
airline competition by strengthening the ability of low-cost car-
rier airlines to compete with the larger and more dominant leg-
acy airlines.' This settlement is significant not only because it
paved the way for the world's largest airline' but also because it
affects the future of antitrust law and the airline industry.
This comment argues that the DOJ settlement allowing the
merger of US Airways and American Airlines failed to ade-
quately protect present and future competition in the industry
and continued the trend of concentration through consolida-
I Complaint at 1-7, United States v. US Airways Group, No. 13-CV-1236
(CKK), 2013 WL 4055128 (D.D.C. Aug. 13, 2013), ECF No. 1.
2 Susan Carey, Fixing a "Fragile" Air Merger, WALL ST. J. (Dec. 2, 2013, 12:24
AM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB20001424052702304579404579232
100811998912.
3 Tiffany Friesen Milone, Experts Ponder Politics of DOJ Settlement in US Airways/
American Airlines Merger, 105 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 815 (Nov.
25, 2013) (noting that one former assistant attorney general considered the ac-
tion to be "a welcome break," but another alumnus and former litigator believed
the complaint "missed entirely the competitive nature of the passenger airline
industry").
4 See infra text accompanying note 139.
5 Id.
6 See, e.g., Gregory Wallace, American Airlines, US Airways to Form Largest Air Car-
rier Monday, CNN MONEY (Dec. 8, 2013, 3:05 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2013/
12/08/news/companies/american-airlines-us-airways-merger.
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tion to a dangerous extent, such that it impacts not only the
future of airline mergers but also that of antitrust enforcement
more generally.
Using both price and quality factors, such as service reliability
and satisfaction, as barometers in the analysis, this comment will
demonstrate that the settlement falls short of satisfying the goals
of antitrust law. Although empirical studies and economic theo-
ries supporting the DOJ's decision will be considered, this com-
ment will argue that the anticompetitive consequences of the
settlement overwhelm any theoretical positive effects from con-
solidation. Finally, the analysis will suggest more appropriate ac-
tion with respect to future airline consolidation and similar
activity in other industries.
In support of this argument, Part II will provide the back-
ground of antitrust law and merger enforcement by describing
the historical development of the governing legal rules and the
shift from judicial review to agency oversight of merger law. Part
III will thoroughly discuss the antitrust claims and the settle-
ment terms of the US Airways and American Airlines merger,
and Part IV will analyze the deal and its impact on the future of
antirust law by critiquing the theories in its support and opposi-
tion and by providing suggestions for remedial action.
II. ANTITRUST LAW BACKGROUND
United States antitrust laws exist to protect consumers who
are harmed by the absence of competition in the market.' While
the Sherman Act prohibits restraints on competition and mo-
nopolistic behavior,' Section 7 of the Clayton Act prohibits ac-
quisitions when "the effect of such acquisition may be
substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a mo-
nopoly."' The legislative history of the Clayton Act reveals the
intent to protect "competition, not competitors, and [Con-
gress's] desire to restrain mergers only to the extent that such
7 See, e.g., Brown Shoe Co. v. United States, 370 U.S. 294, 320 (1962). But see
ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAW, MONOGRAPH No. 12, HORIZONTAL MERGERS:
LAW AND POLIcY 5-7 (1986) [hereinafter MONOGRAPH No. 12] (explaining the
tension between those who believe that increasing consumer welfare through
maximizing economic efficiency is the sole objective of antitrust law and those
who believe that antitrust laws are based on multiple underlying goals, including
social and political values).
8 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (2012).
9 Id. § 18.
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combinations may tend to lessen competition."' 0 Thus, the anti-
trust laws do not exist "to thwart business efficiencies that may
be achieved through the combination of two firms' resources."'
Instead, the Clayton Act intends to "cope with monopolistic ten-
dencies in their incipiency and well before they have attained
such effects as would justify a Sherman Act proceeding"1 2 by al-
lowing the enforcement agencies, the Antitrust Division of the
DOJ and the Federal Trade Commission (FTC), to examine
merger activity that may "create, enhance, or facilitate the exer-
cise of market power.""
A. HISTORICAL MERGER ENFORCEMENT
Because the text of the Clayton Act does not explicitly deline-
ate what activity is prohibited," insight into the historical devel-
opment of merger enforcement is useful in determining the
current state of the law.15 The legal rules governing merger en-
forcement are characterized by continual development and
evolution, as "there is a necessary tension between the need for
certainty on the one hand and the need to consider the peculiar
facts of each case on the other."' 6
10 Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 320. But see id. at 344 ("But we cannot fail to
recognize Congress' desire to promote competition through the protection of
viable, small, locally owned business. Congress appreciated that occasional higher
costs and prices might result from the maintenance of fragmented industries and
markets. It resolved these competing considerations in favor of
decentralization.").
11 ABA SECTION OF ANTITRUST LAw, MERGERS AND ACQUISITIONS: UNDERSTAND-
ING THE ANTITRUST ISSUES 1 (3d ed. 2008) [hereinafter MERGERS AND
AcQuISITIONS].
12 Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 318 n.32 (quoting S. REP. No. 81-1775, at 4296
(1950)); see also FTC v. Lab. Corp. of Am., No. SACV 10-1873 AG (MLGx), 2011
WL 3100372, at *13 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 11, 2011).
13 MERGERS AND AcQuisITIONS, supra note 11; see also United States v. Columbia
Steel Co., 334 U.S. 495, 535-36 (1948) (Douglas, J., dissenting) ("The Curse of
Bigness shows how size can become a menace-both industrial and social. It can
be an industrial menace because it creates gross inequalities against existing and
putative competitors. It can be a social menace-because of its control of
prices.").
14 See 15 U.S.C. § 18 (prohibiting acquisitions when "the effect of such acquisi-
tion may be substantially to lessen competition, or to tend to create a
monopoly").
15 See MONOGRAPH No. 12, supra note 7, at 28.
16 Id.
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The Supreme Court's analysis in Brown Shoe in 1962"1 estab-
lished the pattern used in merger enforcement today." There,
the Court (1) defined the relevant product and geographic mar-
kets;'" (2) analyzed the probable effects of the merger by exam-
ining the market shares of the firms,o the current
concentration of the industry, the trend toward continued con-
solidation in the industry,2' and the statements and behavior of
the individual firms;22 and (3) found a lack of mitigating factors
that would provide procompetitive benefits from the merger.23
The Court, however, subsequently held that this step-by-step
analysis was not necessary in cases in which the merger-created
entity "control[s] an undue percentage share of the relevant
market, and [the merger] results in a significant increase in the
concentration of firms in that market." 2 4 Thus, a merger that
involves levels of market share and market concentration high
enough to "raise an inference" of illegality is presumed to be
anticompetitive, and the merging firms must "rebut the inher-
ently anticompetitive tendency manifested by these
percentages."2 5
Historically, judicial interpretations and applications of Sec-
tion 7 provided the basis for the development of the rules gov-
erning this area of antitrust enforcement. 26 Though courts
considered developments and proposals by economic scholars
and reports by the Office of the Attorney General,2 7 the pre-
merger notification requirement of the Hart-Scott-Rodino Anti-
17 See generally Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. 294.
18 See generally infra Part II.B.
19 Brown Shoe Co., 370 U.S. at 325-28, 336.
20 Id. at 329-31, 343-44.
21 Id. at 331-32, 345.
22 Id. at 332.
23 Id. at 345-46 (holding that the merger must be enjoined since the entity
would control 7.2% of retail shoe stores and 2.3% of retail shoe outlets).
24 United States v. Phila. Nat'l Bank, 374 U.S. 321, 363 (1963) ("[1]ntense con-
gressional concern with the trend toward concentration warrants dispensing ...
with elaborate proof. ).
25 Id. at 366.
26 See generally C. Paul Rogers III, A Concise History of Corporate Mergers and the
Antitrust Laws in the United States, 24 NAT'L L. SCH. INDIA REv. 10 (2013) (on file
with author).
27 See MONOGRAPH No. 12, supra note 7, at 28-62.
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trust Improvements Act" shifted most of the authority to the
enforcement agencies. 2 9
The Hart-Scott-Rodino Act was not the only development that
facilitated this increase in governmental regulation rather than
judicial power;30 the drafting of the Merger Guidelines also as-
sisted in the transition to agency law."' Understanding the diffi-
culty associated with the economic and "multi-valued" nature of
the developing legal rules, 2 the Antitrust Division of the DOJ
published Merger Guidelines in 1968 "to acquaint the business
community, the legal profession, and other interested groups
and individuals with the standards currently being applied."3
As the rules governing merger enforcement have continued
to evolve, the Merger Guidelines have undergone revisions,3 4
and both federal enforcement agencies, the DOJ and the FTC,
released the most recent version in 2010." Although the Merger
Guidelines are not mandatory legal authority,3 6 they provide
28 Pub. L. No. 94-435, 90 Stat. 1383 (1976) (codified as amended at 15 U.S.C.
§ 18a (2012)). This Act established that proposed mergers that exceed a certain
size cannot be legally consummated until expiration of the thirty-day waiting pe-
riod after making the pre-merger filings or waiver by the reviewing agency. See id.;
see also Rogers, supra note 26, at 21.
29 Rogers, supra note 26, at 25 ("Pre-merger notification has, unexpectedly,
shifted U.S. merger policy away from the courts and into the hands of the en-
forcement agencies."); see also Ashutosh Bhagwat, Modes of Regulatory Enforcement
and the Problem of Administrative Discretion, 50 HASTINGS L.J. 1275, 1275 (1999)
("[T]he procedural changes enacted by the HSR have resulted in an enormous
shifting in discretionary and lawmaking power from the courts to the regulatory
agencies who implement the HSR preclearance regime.").
30 Rogers, supra note 26, at 27 ("The relative secrecy of the merger review pro-
cess also reduces the transparency hoped for from the pre-merger notification
requirement and enhances the agencies' effective control over merger policy.").
31 See id. at 24.
32 MONOGRAPH No. 12, supra note 7, at 38.
3 U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, 1968 MERGER GUIDELINES 1 (May 30, 1968), available
at http://www.justice.gov/atr/hmerger/11247.pdf, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep.
(CCH) 1 13,101.
34 See Christine A. Varney, Comment, The 2010 Horizontal Merger Guidelines:
Evolution, Not Revolution, 77 ANTITRUST L.J. 651, 659 (2011) ("The 2010 Guide-
lines reflect actual practice and incorporate the accumulated experience of the
eighteen years since the last significant Guidelines update.").
3 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES 1 (Aug. 19, 2010)
[hereinafter HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES], available at http://wwwjustice
.gov/atr/public/guidelines/hmg-2010.pdf, reprinted in 4 Trade Reg. Rep. (CCH)
1 13,100 ("These Guidelines describe the principal analytical techniques and the
main types of evidence on which the Agencies usually rely to predict whether a
horizontal merger may substantially lessen competition.").
36 See, e.g., FTC v. Whole Foods Mkt., Inc., 548 F.3d 1028, 1046 (5th Cir. 2008).
But see infra note 40.
FUTURE OF AIRLINE MERGERS
guidance both to "the business community and antitrust practi-
tioners by increasing the transparency of the analytical process
underlying the Agencies' enforcement decisions [and to] the
courts in developing an appropriate framework for interpreting
and applying the antitrust laws in the horizontal merger
context."3 7
Furthermore, the enforcement agencies admit that "the
courts have occasionally influenced how the [DOJ and the FTC]
have revised the Guidelines."" This statement and the differ-
ence between the stated purpose of the 1968 Guidelines and
that of the 2010 Guidelines39 reveal the reversal in authority
over merger enforcement.40
B. MERGER GUIDELINES
Because of this shift in merger jurisprudence and the impor-
tance of the Merger Guidelines in understanding the enforce-
ment agencies' antitrust analysis, a brief review of the most
recent Guidelines is helpful. The enforcement agencies ex-
amine "any reasonably available and reliable evidence to address
the central question of whether a merger may substantially
lessen competition."4 First, actual evidence of anticompetitive
effects attributable to the merger may be dispositive in proving
an antitrust violation.4 2 However, it is unlikely that this actual
evidence is already present, given the prospective nature of the
proposed transaction, so the enforcement agencies typically
3 HoRIzoNTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 35. The influence of the
Merger Guidelines is particularly apparent in examples such as the decision of
3M Company not to pursue its proposed partial acquisition of Avery Dennison
Corporation after the DOJ merely informed the firms that it would file a civil
antitrust lawsuit. See Press Release, U.S. Dep't ofJustice, 3M Company Abandons
Its Proposed Acquisition of Avery Dennision's Office and Consumer Products
Group After Justice Department Threatens Lawsuit 1 (Sept. 4, 2012), available at
http://wwwjustice.gov/atr/public/pressjreleases/2012/286647.pdf.
38 ANTITRUST MODERNIZATION COMMISSION, REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
55 (Apr. 2, 2007) [hereinafter REPORTS AND RECOMMENDATIONS], available at
http://govinfo.library.unt.edu/amc/report-recommendation/amc-final_report
.pdf.
3 Compare supra text accompanying note 33 with supra text accompanying note
37.
40 Cf supra notes 26-29. In fact, even when the court had the rare opportunity
to exert its power ofjudicial review in merger enforcement, it relies on the analy-
sis published by the enforcement agencies in the Merger Guidelines and related
commentary. See, e.g., United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36
(D.D.C. 2011).
41 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 35, at 2.
42 Id. at 3.
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make comparisons based on historical experience, examine
market concentration, and calculate subsequent effects from its
increase to determine whether a Clayton Act violation exists.4 3
Even though the Merger Guidelines "were never intended to de-
tail how the Agencies would assess every set of circumstances
that a proposed merger may present,"44 a thorough understand-
ing of them provides great insight into the federal enforcement
of Section 7.
1. Market Definition
In order to properly analyze market concentration and poten-
tial anticompetitive effects of the merger on the market, the en-
forcement agencies must define the relevant product and
geographic market;45 thus, the Merger Guidelines detail various
methods for that determination. Although market definition is
discussed before the market-concentration calculation and com-
petitive-effects analysis, the enforcement agencies specifically
state that the antitrust "analysis need not start with market defi-
nition,"4 particularly because market definition and competi-
tive effects may have a circular relationship." The enforcement
agencies have specified, however, that adding this statement
about the order of the analysis to the most recent Guidelines
does not minimize the necessity and importance of defining rel-
evant markets.4 9 In fact, the DOJ acknowledged that market def-
4 Id. ("The Agencies look for historical events, or 'natural experiments,' that
are informative regarding the competitive effects of the merger. For example, the
Agencies may examine the impact of recent mergers, entry, expansion, or exit in
the relevant market.").
44 U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, COMMENTARY ON THE HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDE-
LINES 3 (Mar. 2006), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/
215247.pdf.
45 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 35, at 7 ("The measurement of
market shares and market concentration is not an end in itself, but is useful to
the extent it illuminates the merger's likely competitive effects.").
46 See id. at 8-12 (discussing the product market definition through the use of
the hypothetical monopolist test, benchmark prices, and SSNIP size); see also id.
at 13-14 (analyzing the geographic market definition based on the locations of
suppliers and customers).
47 Id. at 7.
48 Id. ("Evidence of competitive effects can inform market definition, just as
market definition can be informative regarding competitive effects.").
49 Sharis A. Pozen, Acting Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. DEP'T OFJUSTICE, DEVELOP-
MENTS AT THE ANTITRUST DIVISION & THE 2010 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDE-
LINES-ONE YEAR LATER 17-18 (Nov. 17, 2011), available at http://wwwjustice
.gov/atr/public/speeches/277488.pdf.
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inition could be "a central focus" of the analysis and be outcome
determinative."o
2. Market Concentration
A prospective analysis of market concentration may provide
evidence of potential anticompetitive effects of a merger. The
enforcement agencies often calculate the Herfindahl-Hirsch-
man Index (HHI)1 " to define the concentration of the market
and to calculate and attribute the increased concentration to
merger activity. 2 In highly concentrated markets, 53 activity that
increases the HHI by 200 points is subject to the presumption
that the merger will enhance market power, but persuasive evi-
dence to the contrary can rebut this presumption.
The doctrine established in United States v. General Dynamics"
provides firms with the opportunity to use facts specific to the
firm or its particular industry to rebut the government's statisti-
cal evidence of the anticompetitive effects of a merger." The
Seventh Circuit subsequently accepted a firm's use of the General
Dynamics defense, which is also referred to as the "flailing com-
pany defense,"5 when a firm's inability to readily obtain capital
and its lack of financial resources proved that it was not "as
50 Id. at 18 (citing United States v. H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. 2d 36, 92
(D.D.C. 2011) (holding that the relevant market was digital do-it-yourself tax
preparation products, over which the merged entity would have 90% control,
and did not include assisted or manual tax preparation)). Because, unlike that of
the Sherman Act, a violation of the Clayton Act does not require specific con-
duct, the market definition can determine whether the presumption of illegality
applies. Compare 15 U.S.C. § 2 (2012), with id. § 18.
51 The HHI is calculated by summing the squares of the market shares of indi-
vidual firms in the market, so larger market shares have a proportionally greater
weight. See H&R Block, Inc., 833 F. Supp. at 71.
52 The increase in HHI from a merger is twice the product of the market
shares of the merging firms. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 35,
at 18-19.
53 The DOJ and FTC define such markets as those with the HHI above 2,500.
See id. at 19.
54 Id.
55 415 U.S. 486, 526 (1974).
56 In this case, the Court determined that because "reserves rather than past
production are the best measures of a company's ability to compete" in the coal
market, the merger would not lessen competition to the extent the government's
retrospective data indicated. Id. at 502.
57 This term is used in light of the well-established failing company defense
discussed infra text accompanying notes 75-77. See William J. Kolasky & Andrew
R. Dick, The Merger Guidelines and the Integration of Efficiencies into Antitrust Review of
Horizantal Mergers, 71 ANTITRUST L.J. 207, 214 (2003), available at http://wwwjus
tice.gov/atr/hmerger/ 11254.pdf.
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strong a competitor as the bald statistical projections indicate.1"58
Although a firm has the opportunity to rebut the persuasiveness
of the government's calculations of future anticompetitive con-
sequences with nonstatistical alternatives, 9 the defense is partic-
ularly difficult to establish, as evidenced by the courts' repeated
rejection of attempts to assert it.60
While calculations of market concentration alone provide in-
sight into the potential anticompetitive effects of a merger, as
demonstrated by the rebuttable presumption of illegality, the
determination of market concentration also influences the anal-
ysis of other potential anticompetitive effects from mergers: uni-
lateral and coordinated effects."'
a. Unilateral Effects
The unilateral effects of a merger, acquisition, or joint ven-
ture arise due to the internalization of the competition between
the two firms." Thus, the anticompetitive potential of these ef-
fects depends on the level of competition between the firms and
the degree to which the firms' products are close substitutes;
that is, "a significant fraction of the customers purchasing [one
firm's] product view products formerly sold by the other merg-
ing firm as their next-best choice."" Upon elimination of this
competition by consummation of a merger, a single entity can
raise prices or manipulate prices to the detriment of the con-
sumer.6 4 In addition to adverse price effects, a merger that has
an anticompetitive effect on market concentration may also di-
58 United States v. Int'l Harvester Co., 564 F.2d 769, 773 (7th Cir. 1977); see
alsoJ. Bruce McDonald, Deputy Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't of Justice, ANTI-
TRUST AIRLINEs 8 (Nov. 3, 2005), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/atr/public/
speeches/286981.pdf ("[T]he poor condition of a firm that is not to the point of
failing may be a sign that the firm is not going to be as much of a competitive
[factor] in the future as in the past, and our mergers analysis will take that into
account.").
59 Such alternatives include "(1) ease of entry into the market; (2) the trend of
the market toward or away from concentration; (3) the continuation of active
price competition; [and] (4) unique economic circumstances that undermine
the predictive value of governmental statistics." C. PAUL ROGERS III ET AL., ANTI-
TRUST LAw: POLICY AND PRACTICE 553 (4th ed. 2008) (citations omitted).
60 See id. at 555 (citing Olin Corp. v. FTC, 986 F.2d 1295 (9th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Healthco, Inc., 387 F. Supp. 258 (S.D.N.Y 1975)).
61 See HoIzoNTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 35, at 18.
62 Id. at 20.
63 Id. at 20-21, 22.
64 Id. at 21.
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minish product variety and innovation." Thus, unilateral effects
of increased market concentration may provide evidence of an-
ticompetitive consequences of a merger that would violate Sec-
tion 7.
b. Coordinated Effects
In addition to examining unilateral effects, the DOJ and the
FTC analyze the potential impact of a merger on how the firms
in the market interact. 6 "Coordinated interaction involves con-
duct by multiple firms that is profitable for each of them only as
a result of the accommodating reactions of the others."6 7 Some
coordinated interaction may itself violate antitrust laws,6 8 but
" [p] arallel accommodating conduct includes situations in which
each rival's response to competitive moves made by others is in-
dividually rational . . . but nevertheless emboldens price in-
creases and weakens competitive incentives to reduce prices or
offer customers better terms.""
3. Mitigating Factors
The enforcement agencies also understand that specific fac-
tors in the market may mitigate the anticompetitive impact of
the merger. For example, the presence of "powerful buyers may
constrain the ability of the merging parties to raise prices, "70 and
the potential of new entry into the relevant market "will alleviate
concerns about adverse competitive effects . . . if such entry will
deter or counteract any competitive effects of concern so the
merger will not substantially harm customers."7
Furthermore, the DOJ and the FTC analyze the potential of
procompetitive consequences of the merger by examining the
magnitude of merger-specific efficiencies and the degree to
which these efficiencies are passed through to consumers.
However, the merging firms carry the burden of proof in estab-
lishing the likelihood and magnitude of mitigating efficien-
65 Id. at 23.
66 Id. at 24 ("A merger may diminish competition by enabling or encouraging
post-merger coordinated interaction among firms in the relevant market that
harms customers.").
67 Id.
68 See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1 (2012).
69 HoRIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 35, at 24-25.
7o Id. at 27.
71 Id. at 28.
72 Id. at 29-31.
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cies." The Merger Guidelines specifically state that "efficiencies
are most likely to make a difference in merger analysis when the
likely adverse competitive effects, absent the efficiencies, are not
great" because the enforcement agencies do not merely balance
the magnitude of the anticompetitive harm against that of the
procompetitive efficiencies.
A final mitigating factor that is even more difficult for the
merging firms to establish is the failing company defense.75 The
Supreme Court has recognized that the acquisition of a firm
"with resources so depleted and the prospect of rehabilitation so
remote that it faced the grave probability of a business failure"
does not violate Section 7 because competition is not harmed if
the failing firm would otherwise leave the market.76 The Merger
Guidelines specify three strict requirements in order to invoke
this doctrine, so it remains extremely difficult to assert the
defense."
In conclusion, the Merger Guidelines play a significant role in
the development of antitrust jurisprudence, their value and in-
fluence is widely accepted," and they continue to evolve.79 Fur-
thermore, changing political ideologies may influence the
enforcement agencies. For example, the current Antitrust Divi-
sion has expressed its concern for consumers "and its focus on
safeguarding competition in industries that directly affect day-
to-day lives, including health care, telecommunications and
73 Rachel Brandenburger, Special Advisor, U.S. Dep't of Justice, RECENT DE-
VELOPMENTS IN MERGER CONTROL: VIEWS FROM THE U.S. DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE'S
ANTITRUST DIvISION 6-7 (Sept. 14, 2012), available at http://www.justice.gov/atr/
public/speeches/286981.pdf ("[I]t is 'incumbent upon the merging firms to sub-
stantiate efficiency claims so that the Agencies can verify by reasonable means the
likelihood and magnitude of each asserted efficiency, how and when each would
be achieved (and any costs of doing so), how each would enhance the merged
firm's ability and incentive to compete, and why each would be merger-
specific."').
74 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 35, at 31.
75 Id. at 32.
76 Int'l Shoe Co. v. FTC, 280 U.S. 291, 302 (1930).
77 HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 35, at 32 (requiring that the
firm (1) cannot "meet its financial obligations in the near future"; (2) cannot
"reorganize successfully under Chapter 11 of the Bankruptcy Act"; and (3) "has
made unsuccessful good-faith efforts to elicit reasonable alternative offers").
78 See, e.g., supra notes 37, 40.
79 For example, globalization will likely continue to impact antitrust jurispru-
dence because this advancement "reshape[s] the face of many modern markets."
U.S. DEP'T OF JUSTICE, ANTITRUST DIVISION PoLIcy GUIDE TO MERGER REMEDIES 1
(June 2011), available at http://wwwjustice.gov/atr/public/guidelines/272350
.pdf.
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technology, transportation, office supplies, and other consumer
products."so
Despite factors that implicate the past and future develop-
ment of merger enforcement, the traditional aspects of the anal-
ysis, which include discussions of market definition, market
concentration, potential anticompetitive effects, and mitigating
factors, remain as the foundation of antitrust jurisprudence."'
III. US AIRWAYS AND AMERICAN AIRLINES MERGER
The Antitrust Division of the DOJ and eight attorneys gen-
eral 2 filed a civil lawsuit that challenged the then-proposed
merger between US Airways and American Airlines' parent com-
pany, AMR Corporation .83 According to the DOJ, the merger
would create the world's largest airline and would be anticom-
petitive because it would eliminate the competition between the
two airlines and significantly increase the level of concentration
in the market.84
On August 13, 2013, Assistant Attorney General Bill Baer an-
nounced the DOJ's challenge to the proposed merger 5 and
provided specific examples of the benefits of the head-to-head
competition on certain routes that he predicted would no
longer exist upon consummation of the merger." Thus, the An-
80 Division Update Spring 2013, U.S. DEPARTMENT JUSTICE, http://wwwjustice
.gov/atr/public/division-update/2013/civil-program.html (last visited Mar. 1,
2014).
81 See supra text accompanying notes 19-23.
82 The states of Arizona, Florida, Michigan, Tennessee, Texas, the Common-
wealths of Pennsylvania and Virginia, and the District of Columbia participated in
the suit initially, but Texas dismissed its case with prejudice on October 1, 2013,
after reaching a settlement with the airlines. See Susanne Pagano, Texas Attorney
General Drops Opposition to American Airlines, US Airways Merger, 105 Antitrust &
Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 454 (Oct. 2, 2013).
83 Amended Complaint at 1-2, United States v. US Airways Group, No. 13-CV-
1236 (CKK), 2013 WL 5411082 (D.D.C. Sept. 5, 2013), ECF No. 73.
84 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Files Antitrust Law-
suit Challenging Proposed Merger Between US Airways and American Airlines 1
(Aug. 13, 2013) [hereinafter DOJ Lawsuit Press Release], available at http://www
justice.gov/atr/public/press releases/2013/299960.pdf.
85 Bill Baer, Assistant Att'y Gen., U.S. Dep't ofJustice, Remarks as Prepared for
Delivery.by Assistant Attorney General Bill Baer at the Conference Call Regard-
ing the Justice Department's Lawsuit Challenging US Airways' Proposed Merger
with American Airlines 1 (Aug. 13, 2013) [hereinafter DOJ Lawsuit Remarks],
available at http://wwwjustice.gov/atr/public/speeches/299972.pdf.
86 For example, purchasing an Advantage Fare for a round-trip from Miami to
Cincinnati saves $269, and US Airways' one-stop fare for a round trip from New
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titrust Division expressed its commitment to consumers and to
protecting competition.8
A. THE ANTITRUST CLAIMS
The Amended Complaint alleged that the merger of the two
firms constituted a violation of Section 7 of the Clayton Act 8
because it "would likely substantially lessen competition, and
tend to create a monopoly."" The Antitrust Division reported
that the airlines were able to "succeed on a standalone basis," so
the merger should be enjoined in the interest of competition.90
1. Market Definition
For the proposed merger, the DOJ alleged that the relevant
product market was domestic scheduled air passenger service,91
and each city pair 9 2 provided the relevant geographic market.9 3
In addition, slots at Reagan National Airport, which are ex-
tremely valuable and required for service at that airport,9 4 pro-
vided a second relevant product and geographic market
implicated by the merger.9 5
York to Houston "is about $870 cheaper than the other legacy carriers' nonstop
flights, and even beats JetBlue and AirTran by more than $300." Id. at 2.
87 Id. at 3 ("The lawsuit we filed today to block this deal gives consumers the
best possible chance for continued competition in an important industry that
they have come to rely upon.").
88 15 U.S.C. § 18 (2012).
89 Amended Complaint, supra note 83, at 7 (citing 15 U.S.C. § 18).
90 DOJ Lawsuit Press Release, supra note 84, at 1-2 (noting that even small
increases in airline fares or ancillary fees would cause "hundreds of millions of
dollars of harm").
91 Amended Complaint, supra note 83, at 10 (using the hypothetical monopo-
list test to determine the relevant product market for the airline industry).
92 "A 'city pair' is comprised of a flight's departure and arrival cities." See id.
For example, the city pair of Charlotte, North Carolina and Dallas, Texas in-
cludes flights from Charlotte to Dallas and from Dallas to Charlotte. Id. at 44.
Economists support the use of city pairs, which include flights to all airports in
and around the relevant cities, rather than the use of airport pairs because the
broader approach better accounts for competition by low-cost carriers at the adja-
cent airports. See, e.g., Jan K Brueckner et al., City-Pairs Versus Airport-Pairs: A Mar-
ket Definition Methodology for the Airline Industry, 44 REV. INDUS. ORG. 1, 21 (Feb.
2014), available at http://1ink.springer.com/article/10.1007%2Fsl 1151-012-9371-
7.
93 Amended Complaint, supra note 83, at 11.
94 Id. at 12 ("Slots are expensive (often valued at over $2 million per slot),
difficult to obtain, and only rarely change hands between airlines. There are no
alternatives to slots for airlines seeking to enter or expand their service at Reagan
National.").
95 Id.
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2. Market Concentration
In general, the airline industry is highly concentrated. 6 Prior
to the merger, "four network or 'legacy' airlines remain[ed] in
the United States: American, US Airways, United, and Delta."9 7
A fifth major domestic airline, Southwest Airlines, which does
not have the "hub-and-spoke" service of the legacy airlines, of-
fers some competition on the routes it flies; however, it-and
other low-cost carriers-cannot compete as effectively because
their domestic and international route networks are much less
extensive." Furthermore, legacy airline executives themselves
admitted that low-cost carriers are not strong enough competi-
tors to deter legacy airlines from continuing ancillary fee pro-
grams, 9 providing insight into the true level of concentration in
the relevant market.
Significant consolidation created the high level of concentra-
tion currently in the industry: "The consolidation 'wave' started
with the 2005 merger between US Airways and America West,
creating today's US Airways. In 2008, Delta and Northwest Air-
lines merged; in 2010, United and Continental merged; and in
2011, Southwest Airlines and AirTran merged."100 Because of
the high concentration within the market, the Amended Com-
plaint included a thirteen-page appendix of city pairs with the
calculated HHI and the change attributed to the merger, show-
ing that the merger was presumed to be anticompetitive.101 Fur-
thermore, the DOJ asserted the merger would cause the market-
concentration calculation for the slots at Reagan National to in-
crease by more than seven times the threshold that implicates
the presumption of illegality.10 2
96 Id. at 3.
97 Id. at 12.
8 Id. at 4, 12.
9 See id. at 17-18 ("Our employees know full well that the real competition for
us is [the other legacy airlines]. Yes we compete with Southwest and JetBlue, but
the product is different and the customer base is also different.").
100 Id. at 13.
101 Id. at 15. Appendix A lists the post-merger HHI and the change in HHI
attributable to the merger for 1,007 city pairs that face the presumption of illegal-
ity. See id. at 45-57. The HHIs were calculated using airline ticket revenue data
for 2012 from the Department of Transportation's Airline Origin and Destina-
tion Survey. Id. at 44. For the city pairs listed, the average post-merger HHI is
4,754 and the average change in HHI is 868 points. Recall that the presumption
arises for 2,500 and 200 points, respectively. See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES,
supra note 35, at 19.
102 Amended Complaint, supra note 83, at 15 ("In the market for slots at Rea-
gan National, the merger would result in a highly concentrated market, with a
7952014]
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a. Unilateral Effects
The DOJ also argued that the proposed merger would result
in multiple unilateral anticompetitive effects, including both
price and non-price consequences adverse to consumers. os The
elimination of head-to-head competition would create adverse
price effects both for fares and for ancillary fees.10 4 For example,
US Airways' Advantage Fare program10 5 would no longer be eco-
nomically rational since the company admitted that the majority
of the value of this program exists "on routes where American is
the legacy airline offering nonstop service."o6
In addition to the price effects of unilateral behavior, in-
creased consolidation would allow the airline to participate in
"capacity discipline," which means the airline restrains growth
or reduces its established service to increase revenue.' 0 7 Even an
elementary understanding of the impact of supply and demand
on price corroborates a US Airways executive's statement that
decreased capacity is "inextricabl[ly] link[ed]" to higher
fares. 108
Thus, the DOJ argued that the proposed merger would likely
end American Airlines' plans for expansion.109 In the past few
years, the airline "placed the largest order for new aircraft in the
industry's history" and included significant standalone expan-
sion in both domestic and international flights in its restructur-
ing plan. 1 0 However, the DOJ alleged that US Airways proposed
a merger with American Airlines to exercise control over and
post-merger HHI of 4,959 . . . [and would] increase concentration by 1,493
points.").
103 See id. at 15-32.
104 Id. at 29-31 ("American and US Airways engage in head-to-head competi-
tion with nonstop service on 17 domestic routes representing about $2 billion in
annual industry-wide revenues [and] compete directly on more than a thousand
routes where one or both offer connecting service, representing billions of dol-
lars in annual revenue."). With respect to ancillary fees, such as those associated
with rescheduling flights or checking bags, the merged entity could gain $280
million in additional annual revenue through a "fee harmonization" process by
raising fees to match the higher level charged by US Airways. Id. at 29.
105 The program "offer [s] connecting service that is up to 40% cheaper than
other airlines' nonstop service." Id. at 18.
10 Id. at 22.
107 Id. at 23 ("Each significant legacy airline merger in recent years has been
followed by substantial reductions in service and capacity.").
108 Id.
10 Id. at 26.
110 Id.
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limit this growth, instead of focusing on its own expansion and
ability to compete."'
b. Coordinated Effects
The high concentration and current structure of the airline
industry provide the opportunity and economic rationale for co-
ordinated behavior because "[flew large players dominate the
industry; each transaction is small; and most pricing is readily
transparent."' 1 2 Thus, price signaling and price-leading are al-
ready prevalent in the industry, and increased consolidation cre-
ates increased incentive for parallel pricing behavior."i3 US
Airways acknowledged that the coordinated benefits it exper-
iences as a result of past consolidation when it noted that "fewer
and larger competitors ha [ve] allowed the industry to reap the
benefits [of] capacity reductions and new ancillary revenues like
bag fees."" 4
Coordinated behavior also enables other legacy airlines to
participate in the reduction of their own Advantage Fare pro-
grams and in capacity discipline."' Thus, the DOJ alleged that
the merger not only would increase market concentration to
levels that were presumptively illegal for thousands of city
pairs"' but also would have significant anticompetitive effects
after consideration of the statements and behavior of the merg-
ing firms and trends in the airline industry."17
3. Mitigating Factors
The Amended Complaint asserted that the proposed merger
lacked countervailing factors that would suggest possible
procompetitive effects of the merger."' Understandably, the air-
n' Id.
112 Id. at 15.
113 Id. at 15-16.
114 Id. at 14 (internal quotation marks omitted); see also id. at 28 ("Wow-
[Delta's] $100 [fee] is a lot for [a] second bag. I would think there's a big passen-
ger gag reflex associated with that, but if we can get it, we should charge it.").
115 See id. at 20; see also id. at 25 (quoting an email from the US Airways CEO
who predicted that the analyst testifying before Congress that the United/Conti-
nental merger would not impact service at the Cleveland hub was 'just saying
what they need to . . . to get this approved").
116 See supra note 101.
117 Cf supra text accompanying notes 20-22.
118 Amended Complaint, supra note 83, at 32-33.
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line industry has extremely high barriers to entry."' Although
the benefits of efficiencies gained through consolidation have
been understood and recognized,120 the DOJ argued that these
efficiencies were not sufficient or cognizable in this case,"' so it
was unlikely that consumers would receive benefits sufficient to
rebut the presumption of anticompetitive effects.'2 2
Therefore, the Antitrust Division of the DOJ presented its ar-
gument-in a manner consistent with current antitrust jurispru-
dence 123 -that the proposed merger between US Airways and
American Airlines' parent company violated the Clayton Act
and should be permanently enjoined.'12
B. AIRLINES' RESPONSE
Defendants US Airways and AMR Corporation answered the
Amended Complaint on September 10, 2013.125 Unsurprisingly,
the firms argued that the proposed merger was not anticompeti-
tive and should be permitted in light of the "intensely competi-
tive" nature of the current airline industry. 1 26
Furthermore, the airlines denied the enforcement agency's
claim that there was no evidence of mitigating factors in the
119 Such barriers include "difficulty in obtaining access to slots and gate facili-
ties; the effects of corporate discount programs offered by dominant incumbents;
loyalty to existing frequent flyer programs; an unknown brand; and the risk of
aggressive response to new entry by the dominant incumbent carrier." Id.
120 See supra text accompanying note 23; see also Elizabeth E. Bailey & Jeffrey R.
Williams, Sources of Economic Rent in the Deregulated Airline Industry, 31 J.L. & ECON.
173, 199 (Apr. 1988).
121 Amended Complaint, supra note 83, at 33.
122 Recall that the enforcement agencies do not merely weigh the magnitudes
of the detriment against the benefit, and the creation of even substantial efficien-
cies may be unable to rescue a merger with significant anticompetitive effects. See
supra text accompanying note 74.
123 See generally supra Part II.
124 Amended Complaint, supra note 83, at 7. This action is in accordance with
the enforcement agency's focus on industries that affect the day-to-day lives of
consumers. See supra text accompanying note 80; see also DOJ Lawsuit Press Re-
lease, supra note 84 ("Airline travel is vital to millions of American consumers
who fly regularly for either business or pleasure. . . . Today's action proves our
determination to fight for the best interests of consumers by ensuring robust
competition in the marketplace.").
125 See generally AMR Corp.'s Answer to Amended Complaint, United States v.
US Airways Group, No. 13-CV-1236 (CKK) (D.D.C. Sept. 10, 2013), ECF No. 80.
126 Id. at 1 ("US Airways and American [are] seeking to position themselves to
be more effective long-term competitors in that environment . .. fully capable of
competing with the two that exist today (Delta and United, themselves created by
mergers permitted by Plaintiffs).").
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transaction, arguing that the merged airline "would generate
enormous direct consumer benefit, most significantly by creat-
ing a unified network affording a vastly expanded array of flight
options for travelers-taking more passengers where they want
to go when they want to go there."12 8 In addition, the firms ar-
gued that the merger would reduce costs by $150 million
annually.1 2 1
The Answer appeared to invoke a General Dynamics defense'
by describing the "central facts and economic realities of today's
airline industry" to rebut the appropriateness of the calculations
used in the Amended Complaint."' Specifically, the airlines ar-
gued that the industry has suffered in the thirty-five years since
deregulation13 2 and is characterized by intense competition due
to the emergence, expansion, and "demonstrable success of low-
cost carriers"" and the consolidation of the other legacy air-
lines.1 3 ' According to the airlines, the merger was the "only ex-
tant plan" for American Airlines' emergence from bankruptcy,
and enjoining it would "prolong this cycle of crisis.""'
127 Id. at 2, 14.
128 The airlines reminded the DOJ of its own comments regarding this unified
network; the merger of Delta and Northwest created consumer benefits by "com-
bining under single ownership the complementary aspects of the airlines' net-
works." Id. at 2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
129 Id. (valuing the benefits passed to consumers as a result of these efficiencies
at $500,000,000 annually, net of any fare effects). This figure was the net of "im-
proved pay and benefits and welcome job stability for many thousands of airline
employees who have been among the victims of this industry's tumultuous past."
This tumult referred to the profitability issues that characterize the industry: "US
Airways has undergone two bankruptcies in recent years, and American has un-
dergone one, from which it has not yet emerged." Id.
130 See generally supra Part II.B.2.
131 See AMR Corp.'s Answer to Amended Complaint, supra note 125, at 2 ("To-
gether, the two airlines lost almost $14 billion in the last twelve years, and the
uncertainty and shocks that have prevailed in today's airline industry, make the
need for their combination all the more important to consumers.").
132 US Airways Group's Answer to Amended Complaint at 2, United States v.
US Airways Group, No. 13-CV-1236 (CKK) (D.D.C. Sept. 10, 2013), ECF No. 79
("The post-deregulation history of legacy carriers is one of staggering financial
loss, dozens of bankruptcies, hundreds of thousands of lost jobs, dramatic reduc-
tions in employee pay and benefits, and painful restructuring.").
133 Id.
134 Id. at 3 (noting that the 2008 merger of Delta and Northwest and the 2010
merger of United and Continental "created airlines with much larger and more
comprehensive networks than either American or US Airways, leaving both
American and US Airways at a competitive disadvantage which cannot be over-
come on a standalone basis").
135 Id. at 4.
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In addition, the airlines alleged that the city pair HHI calcula-
tions did not accurately reflect the current competitive environ-
ment because those listed were merely "a fraction" of the
current routes,1 36 and most of these one-stop routes would con-
tinue to be competitive.1 3 7 They noted that the two airlines di-
rectly competed on only seventeen of the 623 domestic nonstop
routes, most of which are also served by low-cost carriers that
provided "vigorous" competition.1 3 1
Thus, US Airways and American Airlines' parent company at-
tempted to rebut the persuasiveness of the predicted anticompe-
titive effects by explaining the history and trends of the industry,
the weakness of American Airlines' current financial state, and
the inappropriateness of the HHI calculations, all of which sug-
gested that the DOJ's statistics did not accurately reflect the indi-
vidual firm's future ability to compete.
C. SETTLEMENT
After three months of litigation, the DOJ published a press
release announcing a proposed settlement that would require
the merged airline to divest slots and gates at "key airports"
across the country, which would provide low-cost carriers the op-
portunity and incentive to enter or to increase capacity in these
markets. 13 9 The settlement did not address all of the antitrust
concerns alleged by the enforcement agency,o as it did not re-
quire the merged entity to continue with American Airlines' ex-
pansion plans or to "create Advantage Fares where they might
otherwise be eliminated."1 4 ' However, the DOJ believed that
growth and lower fare options would still arise due to the oppor-
156 AMR Corp.'s Answer to Amended Complaint, supra note 125, at 2 ("The
remaining routes in DOJ's list are 994 one-stop connecting overlaps, a fraction of
the more than 13,000 that American and US Airways serve.").
137 This competition would remain because (1) either American or US Airways
"flies less than 10% of the passengers" on nearly half of the routes; (2) at least
three airlines would remain for almost 90% of the routes; and (3) low-cost carri-
ers would continue to serve 85% of these routes' passengers. Id. at 3.
138 Id. at 2.
139 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Justice Department Requires US Air-
ways and American Airlines to Divest Facilities at Seven Key Airports to Enhance
System-Wide Competition and Settle Merger Challenge 1 (Nov. 12, 2013) [here-
inafter DOJ Settlement Press Release], available at http://wwwjustice.gov/atr/
public/press-releases/2013/301616.pdf.
-@ See generally Amended Complaint, supra note 83.
141 Competitive Impact Statement at 8, United States v. US Airways Group, No.
13-CV-1236 (CKK) (D.D.C. Nov. 12, 2013), ECF No. 148.
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tunities for new competition created by the transfer in owner-
ship of the divested assets from legacy to non-network airlines. 1 4 2
1. Required Divestitures
Under the proposed settlement, the DOJ would appoint a
monitoring trustee to oversee compliance with the required
divestitures and to ensure that the combined airline does not
reacquire ownership of the divested assets during the term of
the settlement. 14 3 The settlement suggested that the divestitures
at Boston Logan International, Chicago O'Hare International,
Dallas Love Field, Los Angeles International, Miami Interna-
tional, New York LaGuardia International, and Ronald Reagan
Washington National would facilitate competition by providing
non-legacy airlines the ability "to compete more extensively na-
tionwide [, which] will enhance meaningful competition in the
industry and benefit airline travelers."1 4 4 Specifically, the
merged airline must divest 104 slots at Reagan National, thirty-
four slots at LaGuardia, and two gates and ground facilities at
the remaining five airports.1 45
According to the DOJ, this agreement involved the largest
ever divestitures in an airline merger, allowed more direct and
connecting domestic flights by low-cost carriers,"' and was a
"game changer" that "has the potential to shift the landscape of
the airline industry." 1 4 7 The Antitrust Division provided histori-
cal evidence to support this claim: when JetBlue began flying
out of Reagan National, the prices of flights to Boston decreased
30%, so consumers saved $50 million annually from just sixteen
slots that were subleased from American Airlines.14  However,
the settlement required American Airlines to divest not only
142 Thus, the settlement would "impede the industry's evolution toward a
tighter oligopoly by requiring the divestiture of critical facilities to carriers that
will likely use them to fly more people to more places at more competitive fares."
Id.
143 DOJ Settlement Press Release, supra note 139, at 2-3.
144 Id. at 1.
145 Press Release, U.S. Dep't of Justice, Remarks as Prepared for Delivery by
Assistant Attorney General Bill Baer at the Conference Call Regarding the Justice
Department's Proposed Settlement with US Airways and American Airlines 1




148 Id. at 2.
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those slots, but also eighty-eight more at Reagan National.14 9
Similarly, Southwest acquired thirty-six slots at Newark Liberty
International that were divested during the United-Continental
merger, and fares subsequently dropped 10%, while passenger
traffic increased by 36% for certain routes.5 0
2. Opinion of the Department of Justice
Spokespersons for the DOJ, and for the Antitrust Division in
particular, were pleased with the settlement"'1 and with its impli-
cations for the future of the airline industry and low-cost carri-
ers.15 2 The DOJ believed that because the divestitures would
provide low-cost carriers greater access to these major airports,
competition would increase for both non-stop and connecting
flights around the country."5 s
Because of the opportunities for competition by low-cost car-
rier airlines that result from these divested slots and gates, the
DOJ asserted that the settlement provided an outcome "better
than a full stop injunction."15' It believed that the settlement
addressed multiple antitrust concerns, those arising from the
disappearance of head-to-head competition between the two
merging legacy airlines and those focusing on the inability of
non-network airlines to compete adequately in many geographic
markets throughout the country.' 5 5 The settlement purported to
alleviate these issues by lowering barriers to enter and compete
at these airports so that low-cost carriers could expand and
strengthen their networks.15 6 For example, low-cost carriers
gained access to slots previously owned by legacy airlines at Rea-
gan National, whereas the proposed merger would have given




151 Id. ("I'm proud of our team, proud of our collaboration with the Attorneys
General of the seven states who joined in this settlement and proud of what we
have accomplished for U.S. consumers.").
152 Id. at 1-2 ("This settlement ... will disrupt [the] cozy relationships among
the incumbent legacy carriers and provide consumers with more choices and
more competitive airfares.").
153 Id. at 1.
154 Id.
155 See generally supra Part III.A.
156 DOJ Settlement Remarks, supra note 145, at 2.
157 DOJ Settlement Press Release, supra note 139, at 2.
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Thus, the Antitrust Division projected that the stipulations
within the proposed settlement, particularly the procompetitive
effects of the divestitures, would increase competition in the air-
line industry so that "consumers all across the country . . . will
benefit from more choices and more competitive airfares."'"
3. Opinion of the Airlines Executives
Similarly, executives at American Airlines and US Airways ex-
pressed their satisfaction and optimism for the future." Tom
Horton, the chairman, president, and CEO of AMR Corpora-
tion, echoed the thoughts previously expressed by the airlines160
when he said, "There is much more work ahead of us[,] but
we're energized by the challenge and look forward to compet-
ing vigorously in the ever-changing global marketplace."'6
In addition, the airlines provided specific information regard-
ing the impact of the settlement. Complying with the required
divestitures would affect only 112 of the combined airline's
6,700 daily flights. 16 2 Despite divesting slots at Reagan National
and LaGuardia, the airline would provide 57.05% and 28.30%
of airport departures, respectively.16 3 For the remaining five air-
ports, the airline would occupy 55.74% of gates at Miami,
44.59% at O'Hare, 29.55% at Boston Logan, 21.30% at Los An-
geles, and 0.00% at Dallas Love Field.16 4
Thus, the litigation ended with a settlement that both parties
appeared to support: the enforcement agency claimed that the
deal satisfied its antitrust concerns, and the airlines reminded
consumers and investors that the settlement impacted its opera-
tions only minimally.1 6 5 However, the true impact of this merger
should not be confined to the opinions of the parties involved.
158 Id.
159 AM!R Corporation and US Airways Announce Settlement with U.S. Department of
justice and State Attorneys General, Am. AIRLINEs NEWSROOM (Nov. 12, 2013), http:/
/hub.aa.com/en/nr/pressrelease/amr-corporation-and-us-airways-announce-set
tlement-with-us-department-of-justice-and-state-attorneys-general [hereinafter Set-
tlement Statement] ("We are pleased to have this lawsuit behind us and look for-
ward to building the new American Airlines together.").
160 See supra text accompanying notes 130-35 to recall the airlines' General Dy-
namics defense.
161 Settlement Statement, supra note 159.
162 Terms of the Deal: Slot and Gate Divestiture Impact on the New American Airlines,




165 See generally supra Part III.C.2-3.
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IV. ANALYSIS
The US Airways and American Airlines merger demands anal-
ysis because of its significance in the creation of the world's larg-
est airline and because of the magnitude of the industry and its
impact on the everyday lives of American consumers."' It is sig-
nificant also for the future of airline consolidation and of
merger enforcement generally.
A. THE EFFECTS OF THE SETTLEMENT
While some observers agreed with the positive outlook on the
future level of competition' 7 as expressed by the parties in-
volved,16 others criticized the settlement by doubting the claims
that the deal would benefit consumers by increasing competi-
tion in the airline industry.'
Furthermore, economic studies and theories provide varied
evidence, some of which support the settlement and some of
which confirm the fears of its opponents.170 However, a search-
ing critique of these conflicting theories supports the position
that the US Airways and American Airlines merger represents
the failure of the DOJ to adequately protect competition and
consumers.
1. Diminished Competition
According to the DOJ, the settlement is beneficial to competi-
tion because it strengthens the ability of low-cost carriers to com-
pete with the legacy airlines.17' This procompetitive outcome,
however, is uncertain both in result and degree. For example,
the American Antitrust Institute, which initially praised the DOJ
for pursuing the lawsuit,17 2 vehemently opposed the settlement
and questioned the impact and likelihood of the increased com-
166 See, e.g., DOJ Lawsuit Remarks, supra note 85, at 3.
167 See, e.g., Edward Russell & Kristin Majcher, Merger Makes Everyone a Winner,
AIRLINE Bus., Dec. 2013, at 10.
168 See generally supra Part III.C.2-3.
169 See, e.g., Cecelia M. Assam, Proposed Spin-offs at Seven Major Airports Satisfy DOJ
in US Ainvays/American Merger, 105 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 637
(Nov. 12, 2013).
17o See generally infra Part IV.A.1-2.
171 See supra Part III.C.2.
172 Antitrust Experts Applaud DOJ Action Against Airline Merger, AM. ANTITRUST
INST. (Aug. 13, 2013), http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/content/antitrust-ex
perts-applaud-doj-action-against-airline-merger [hereinafter Experts Question DOJ's
Remedies].
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petition, alleging that the government "has traded off one inde-
pendent national hub-and-spoke carrier for the possibility that
two point-to-point carriers will be enabled to grow into the
equivalent of a replacement competitor."1 3 It asserted that cur-
rently the networks of the low-cost carriers are not strong
enough to rival the competition of a fellow legacy airline."'
Therefore, it concluded that the supposed increase in competi-
tion from the divestitures is hypothetical, whereas the competi-
tion that existed prior to the merger was observable."' The
results of several econometric studies support this conclusion
that the merger will lead to an overall decrease in competition,
which will have anticompetitive effects on the price and quality
of air travel.
a. Impact on Price
A look at recent mergers and their impact on airline fares
provides some insight into predicting the overall price effect of
this merger. On October 29, 2008, the DOJ determined that the
merger of Delta and Northwest would "drive down costs for con-
sumers without dampening competition in the industry" be-
cause of the "minimum overlap" of the two airlines' routes.1 7 6
Then, in August 2010, the DOJ approved the merger of United
and Continental upon the condition that the merged airline
lease slots at Newark Liberty International to Southwest for eigh-
teen flights.1 7 7 Each of these mergers successively formed what
was then the world's largest carrier. 7
Regression analysis of airfares after the Delta merger reveals
that the effect of a merger on fares "can be judged from the
impact of changes in competition among carriers not involved
in mergers;" that is, the prices depend not only on the size of
the competitor, but also on the type of the competitor."'7 Specif-
173 Antitrust Experts Question DOJ's Remedies in Mega-Airline Merger Settlement, AM.
ANTITRUST INST. (Nov. 12, 2013), http://www.antitrustinstitute.org/content/anti
trust-experts-question-dojs-remedies-mega-airline-merger-settlement [hereinafter
Experts Question DOJ's Remedies].
174 See supra note 99 and accompanying text.
175 Experts Question DOJ's Remedies, supra note 173.
176 Dan Luo, The Pice Effects of the Delta/Northwest Airline Merger, 44 REv. INDUS.
ORG. 27, 29 (Feb. 2014), available at http://ink.springer.com/article/10. 1007%2
Fs1151-013-9380-1.
177 Justin Dickerson, Antitrust in the Skies: The United and Olympic Airline Mergers,
15 TOURO INT'L L. RiEv. 1, 10 (2012).
17 Id. at 2.
179 See Luo, supra note 176, at 45.
2014] 805
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
ically, regression analysis predicts that, for nonstop markets,
prices decrease 3% when a legacy airline enters the market and
21.8% when a low-cost carrier provides the additional nonstop
competition.s 0 When the new entrants offer a connecting
flight, the nonstop fare decreases 3.3% after low-cost carrier en-
try, but any price change after a legacy airline provides addi-
tional connecting competition is statistically insignificant.'8 ' In
connecting markets, an additional legacy competitor decreases
fares by 2.8%, and entry by a low-cost carrier decreases fares by
6%.'" These findings seem to support the DOJ's claim that in-
creasing the strength of the low-cost carriers will have a signifi-
cant procompetitive effect on the airline industry, but this
conclusion is premature.
The regression coefficient predicts a 2.3% increase in fares in
connecting markets, but the actual fare change was close to
zero, which suggests that the loss of direct competition
prompted entry into those connecting markets.' However, for
nonstop routes over which the merging airlines previously com-
peted, the regression coefficient is statistically insignificant, but
the actual fares increased by 5.1%.184 The majority of this price
increase appears to be attributable to the merger causing the
low-cost carriers to exit those nonstop markets.' 8 5 Furthermore,
instead of the 21.8% price decrease after additional low-cost car-
rier competition,' the price effect was only 12% after consum-
mation of the merger, due to the entity's increased market
power.""
Thus, comparing the regression results to actual prices after
the Delta merger suggests that the increase in market power out-
weighs possible mitigating factors, such as new entry or effi-
ciency gains, so that fares rise.188 Although competition from
low-cost carriers can have greater impact on prices than that
18o Id. at 35.
181 Id. at 37.
182 Id. at 38.
183 Id.
184 Id. at 45.
1s5 Id.
186 Supra text accompanying note 180.
187 Luo, supra note 176, at 39-40.
-8 Id. at 40. But seeJan K. Brueckner et al., Airline Competition and Domestic U.S.
Airfares: A Comprehensive Reappraisal, 2 ECON. TRANsp. 1, 14 (Mar. 2013) ("The
projected potential aggregate fare increases from most legacy mergers are thus
relatively small, and they are presumably far overshadowed by the potential effi-
ciency gains from such mergers.").
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from legacy airlines,'" low-cost carrier entry is unlikely,' and
the magnitude of its effect on prices decreases as market con-
centration increases.191
Furthermore, an economic study of the effects of the US Air-
ways and America West Airlines merger supports the conclusion
that additional low-cost carrier competition is unlikely by find-
ing that mergers do not have a significant positive effect on en-
try behavior.'9 2 It theoretically concludes that a profitable
merger that does not generate significant efficiencies "inevitably
decreases consumer welfare irrespective of entry conditions."1 93
This conclusion depends on the assumptions that the airline in-
dustry is comparable to a Cournot oligopolyl 94 and that firms
decide to merge to increase profits, either by generating effi-
ciencies or by utilizing barriers to entry to charge supracompeti-
tive prices."' Regression analysis empirically supports this
conclusion by revealing that the merger did not have significant
entry-inducing effect on the behavior of competitors."'
Historical calculations of the impact of additional competi-
tion greatly exceed those measured using current data.'9 This
general trend provides additional support for the conclusion
that as consolidation continues, the potential for and magnitude
of additional competition decreases."' Specifically, even when
potential entrants are present at both airports for a given route,
189 See generally Luo, supra note 176.
190 See, e.g., infra text accompanying notes 198-199; C. Lanier Benkard et al.,
Simulating the Dynamic Effects of Horizontal Mergers: U.S. Airlines, CENTRE FOR ECON.
POL'Y REs. (May 2010), at 32-33, avalaible at http://dev3.cepr.org/meets/wkcn/
6/6684/papers/BenkardFinal.pdf (finding that when legacy airlines merge, en-
try by other legacy airlines is more likely than entry by low-cost carriers).
191 Luo, supra note 176, at 40.
192 See generally Patrice Bougette et al., Do Horizontal Mergers Induce Entry? Evi-
dence from the US Airline Industry, 21 APPLIED ECON. LETTERS 31 (2014).
193 Id. at 32.
194 The Cournot model involves a concentrated industry in which firms com-
pete based on output because there is no product differentiation. See id. at 32.
195 Id. at 31-32.
196 Id. This study used airport pairs, instead of city pairs, as the relevant market,
which may underestimate the impact of low-cost carriers operating in adjacent
markets; however, not all airports within a city are proper substitutes. See
Brueckner et al., City-Pairs Versus Airport-Pairs, supra note 92.
197 Brueckner et al., supra note 188, at 2 ("When the analysis is repeated using
data from 2000, the results show a much larger fare impact from a second non-
stop legacy carrier as well as fare reductions from legacy competition at adjacent
airports.").
198 Supra text accompanying note 191.
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regression analysis reveals that even these airlines may not be
effective "competitive threats" in that geographic market. 99
Thus, synthesis of these econometric results suggests that pos-
sible procompetive price effects from increased competition
through new entry are unlikely, when considering the reality of
the behavior of the airlines and the impact of the merged en-
tity's market dominance on that behavior. Specifically with re-
spect to the US Airways and American Airlines merger, the
supposed increase in competition from low-cost carriers is
doubtful especially because the effect of the divestitures is mini-
mal or already realized. For example, divesting the two gates at
Love Field will have an insignificant effect on competition be-
cause, although American Airlines owned the gates, it leased
them to Delta "because a few miles to the northwest of Love
Field is Dallas/Ft. Worth International (DFW), which is Ameri-
can's largest and most important hub."20 0 In fact, low-cost carri-
ers do not operate in the relevant markets because of factors
that are driven by strategic business considerations, not necessa-
rily because of a lack of access to the relevant airports .2 0 1 Even if
other airlines, such as Delta, JetBlue, and Southwest,202 are inter-
ested in acquiring the slots, the divestitures will have a minimal
impact: less than 7% of the merged entity's daily departures
from LaGuardia and about 15% from Reagan National. 2 0 3
Considering that this analysis reveals a more accurate predic-
tion of the price effect of the settlement, the DOJ should have
blocked the merger or, alternatively, should have required dives-
titures substantial enough to have a significant positive effect on
new entry. A recent study of agency action in merger enforce-
ment used regression analysis to show that alternative remedies,
such as divestitures, "are not generally adequate to the task of
preserving competition." 2 04 "[S]tronger policy measures-out-
199 Philip C. Gayle & Chi-Yin Wu, A Re-Examination of Incumbents' Response to the
Threat of Entry: Evidence from the Airline Industry, 3 ECON. TRANSP. 95, 119 (2013).
200 CyrUS Sanati, The Biggest Loser in US Airways-American Deal? You., CNN
MONEY (Nov. 13, 2013, 9:46 AM), http://finance.fortune.cnn.com/2013/11/13/
usairways-american-merger-fail.
201 Id. ("Pretty much any airline that wants to fly into these big airports can do
so, meaning that this concession won't really help the competitive
environment.").
202 Russell & Majcher, supra note 167.
203 Sanati, supra note 200 (arguing that these low percentages are "hardly
earth-shattering" considering the size of the merged airline).
204 John E. Kwoka, Jr., Does Merger Control Work? A Retrospective on U.S. Enforce-
ment Actions and Merger Outcomes, 78 ANTITRUST L.J. 619, 644 (2013).
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right opposition or structural remedies instead of conduct/con-
ditions approaches-may be warranted in more cases than they
are at present applied."205
b. Impact on Quality
The decreased competition attributable to the US Airways
and American Airlines merger will affect not only airfares but
also non-price factors, such as route networks, reliability, and
service quality. Although the DOJ argued that fears of capacity
discipline would be alleviated by expansion of low-cost carri-
ers,20 6 these non-network airlines historically do not serve small
and rural communities and arguably do not have the network
capacity to enter those markets.o2 0 The significance of this con-
cern motivated bipartisan legislators to question the settlement
and its non-price impact on their constituents.20o Delta, a legacy
airline, reportedly "sees itself as the best airline suited to provide
nonstop service between [Reagan National] and the small- and
mid-sized cities," 209 which puts into question the rationale that
the settlement divestitures will promote expansion of low-cost
carriers.
Those who believe that the "complimentary nature of the
American Airlines and US Airways' networks" suggests that there
is no expectation for a significant decrease in domestic capac-
ity2 1 0 fail to consider the economic reality of the current market
and the incentives that drive this consolidation. Theoretically,
the firms agreed to merge because they predicted that combina-
tion would be profitable, 2 1 1 and historical evidence reveals that
exercising capacity discipline provides a source of that profit.2 1 2
205 Id.
206 See supra text accompanying note 142.
207 See Tiffany Friesen Milone, Bipartisan Leaders Question Proposed Settlement Be-
tween DO, Merging Airlines, 105 Antitrust & Trade Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 704 (Nov.
22, 2013).
208 Id. (arguing that the merged entity's compliance with the deal and divesti-
ture of assets "may further compound an already problematic situation for small
communities" because the low-cost carriers "generally provide service only to
larger markets").
209 Russell & Majcher, supra note 167.
210 Id.
211 See supra text accompanying note 195.
212 See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
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In addition, the reliability and service quality of air travel de-
creases with consolidation."' Regression analysis reveals "that
routes that experienced a relative increase (decrease) in con-
centration experienced a relative increase (decrease) in de-
lays."21 4 Specifically, the data estimates that the consummation
of the originally planned merger between US Airways and Amer-
ican Airlines would increase arrival delay that "would impose
costs of $70 to $105 million on passengers. "215
2. Continued Consolidation
As previously discussed, the airline industry has undergone
massive consolidation since deregulation in 1978.216 Over the
past thirty-six years, "32 carriers merged and re-merged" such
that only three legacy airlines-United, American, and Delta-
remain, with Southwest and other regional carriers attempting
to compete in the industry.1 Although some believe that this
consolidation creates efficiencies that enable stability and profit-
ability, mergers have historically resulted in adverse price and
non-price effects for consumers.1 8 Past DOJ inaction or insuffi-
cient action should not provide an excuse for the present and
for future failure. 219 The consummation of the US Airways and
American Airlines merger not only continues the trend of con-
solidation but also promotes and encourages future mergers.
An empirical study of past airline mergers reveals the endoge-
nous nature of airline mergers; that is, current mergers tend to
make subsequent mergers more profitable. 2 20 For example, only
21% of the simulated mergers between US Airways and Ameri-
can Airlines were profitable prior to the Delta merger, but 40%
213 Daniel Greenfield, Competition and Service Quality: New Evidence from the Air-
line Industry, 3 ECON. TRANsP. 80, 87 (2014).
214 Id.
215 Id.
216 See supra text accompanying note 100; see also Figure 1 infra Part VI; Susan
Carey et al., More Stable Airlines Fly Out of Mergers, WALL ST.J. Bus. (Feb. 11, 2013,
7:23 PM), http://online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB000142412788732488050457
8298443582454684.
217 Justin Bachman, The Fallout from Fewer Airlines, BLOOMBERG Bus. WK. (Nov.
14, 2013), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/2013-11-14/2014-outlook-few
er-airlines-more-fees.
218 Id. ("Consolidation has been accompanied by higher prices, fewer flights in
many markets, and a generally lousier flying experience.").
219 See infra Part IV.A.3.
220 See Peichun Wang, Empirical Evidence of Airline Merger Waves Based on a Selec-
tive Entry Model, DUKE ECON. 31 (2012), available at http://econ.duke.edu/
uploads/mediaitems/thesis-wang-2.original.pdf.
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were profitable after it. 2 2 1 Thus, 19.2% of the simulated mergers
became profitable after the Delta merger, but 0.2% (one out of
526) became unprofitable."2 This study further suggests the po-
tential domino effect of industry consolidation.
3. Increased Agency Power
The shift in authority over merger enforcement223 should not
result in giving these political enforcement agencies the power
and discretion to ignore Section 7 and to allow anticompetive
mergers if they believe it will strengthen the industry. A history
of consolidation and profitability issues in the industry should
not provide a reason for government inaction, 4 as protection
of an individual competitor at the expense of overall competi-
tion conflicts with the purpose of antitrust law. 2 It may appear
that agency discretion would support consumer welfare due to
the importance of the airline industry, but it is likely that the
anticompetitive effects of the merger outweigh possible con-
sumer benefit from avoiding bankruptcy restructuring loss.2 26 In
fact, it is most probable that the investors of the relevant entities
are those who benefit most from agency discretion, for they un-
derstand industry risks and likely damand a proportional
return.
The DOJ may have believed that allowing the merger was nec-
essary to prevent a total collapse of the legacy airlines and
strengthen domestic carriers to compete with foreign ones.
While this argument supports the settlement, it does not con-
sider the magnitude of the anticompetitive effects of the
merger.2 Mitigating factors, including the failing or flailing de-
fenses, usually cannot rescue a merger if the anticompetitive ef-
221 Id. at 29-30.
222 Id. at 30.
223 See generally supra Part II.A.
224 Recall that the requirements of the failing company defense are not met for
a firm merely restructuring in bankruptcy. Supra note 77 (citing HORIZONTAL
MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 35, at 32); see Paul Stinson, Bankruptcy Judge Ap-
proves AMR Merger; New Entity Shares Expected to Trade Dec. 9, 105 Antitrust & Trade
Reg. Rep. (BNA) No. 741 (Dec. 3, 2013).
225 See supra notes 7, 10 and accompanying text.
226 See generally supra Part IV.A.
227 See Sanati, supra note 200 (quoting the airline analyst at J.P. Morgan who
stated, "Why mince words? 'A win for the airlines' is how we view the negotiated
settlement . . . .").
228 See generally supra Part IV.A.
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fects are significant.229 Furthermore, the fact that the companies
are individually flailing merely rebuts the presumption of mar-
ket power;230 it should not support the rationale that the agen-
cies should bolster specific entities using their own discretion in
merger enforcement.
As previously discussed, the DOJ allowed the creations of suc-
cessive largest airlines with little or no action. 3 Commencing
the action to block the US Airways and American Airlines
merger after its prior laissez-faire attitude toward airline consoli-
dation confused not only the parties involved2 3 2 but also others
who believed that the DOJ's "sudden change of heart was ...
hypocritical, reducing its credibility on this issue."12 3  Arguing
that prior antitrust inaction supports continued and future inac-
tion fails to recognize the importance of competition and favors
certainty over consumer welfare.2 34 Although consistent anti-
trust enforcement would provide more clarity, it is not a proper
excuse for failing to act when necessary.
Furthermore, others have argued that the entire case, from
filing the lawsuit to settlement, was politically motivated and "de-
cided on exogenous grounds."'23 The argument is that the law-
suit "had nothing to do with Clayton Act § 7 and everything to
do with the number of slots held by the merging airlines at an
airport frequented by members of Congress."2 3 6 The lack of ju-
dicial review and transparency of this settlement provides more
room for increased agency control over the airline industry and
a further reduction of public trust.
229 See HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 35, at 29, 31.
230 Supra text accompanying note 57.
231 See, e.g., supra text accompanying notes 176-78.
232 See AMR Corp.'s Answer to Amended Complaint, supra note 125, at 1.
233 Sanati, supra note 200 (arguing that the case was "shaky" from the begin-
ning because "the DOJ allowed consolidation in the airline industry to go on for
years with little to no opposition").
234 See Milone, supra note 3 (stating that the current system in which "the ulti-
mate decision-maker is a political figure . . . produces some 'inconsistent' results,
but by and large it is better than any alternative advanced so far"); see also supra
note 7 and accompanying text.
235 See id. (noting that a former FTC Commissioner believed the resolution of
the case was a "travesty.").
236 Id. Although the DOJ provided 1,007 city pairs with average increases in
HHI of 868 points to an average post-merger HHI of 4,754, see supra note 101, the
most significant required divestiture occurred at Reagan National, ignoring the
thousands of other cities involved in these presumptively illegal markets. See gener-
ally supra Part III.C.1.
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Therefore, it is apparent that the settlement that allowed US
Airways and American Airlines to merge will have an overall de-
crease in competition because it is unlikely that the other air-
lines, particularly the low-cost carriers, can appropriately
expand to compete with the world's largest airline. In addition,
this merger strengthens the trends of consolidation in the indus-
try and of increasing agency power, both of which can negatively
impact the consumer. The enforcement agencies must remedy
this failure with stronger merger enforcement in the future and
in other industries as well.
B. CURRENT APPLICATION IN ANOTHER INDUSTRY
The US Airways and American Airlines merger will influence
other industries. For example, Comcast Corporation recently
announced its agreement to acquire Time Warner Cable Inc. to
create the country's largest cable provider.2 3 7 The response was
immediate, varied, and vehement.23
Although Comcast and Time Warner do not operate in the
same areas, the elimination of head-to-head competition is not
the primary antitrust concern in these type mergers.239 Rather,
opponents worry about the merged entity's control over content
due to increased bargaining power with media companies.240
This increase in leverage raises antitrust concerns because "the
interplay between different providers as they separately bargain
with distributors is a form of competition."24' Furthermore, be-
237 David Farber, Comcast Set To Buy Time Warner Cable in All-Stock Deal, CNBC
(Feb. 12, 2014, 10:02 PM), http://www.cnbc.com/id/101412815.
238 Compare Susan Crawford, Comcast's Time Warner Deal Is Bad for America,
BLOOMBERG VIEW (Feb. 13, 2014, 11:27 AM), http://www.bloombergview.com/
articles/2014-02-13/comcast-s-time-warner-deal-is-bad-for-america, with Larry
Popelka, Comcast-Time Warner Merger Is Good for Competition-and Consumers,
BLOOMBERG Bus. WK. (Feb. 18, 2014), http://www.businessweek.com/articles/
2014-02-18/comcast-time-warner-merger-good-for-competition-and-consumers.
239 If a Cable Giant Becomes Bigger, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 14, 2014, at A30, available at
http://www.nytimes.com/2014/02/14/opinion/if-a-cable-giant-becomes-bigger
.html.
24 Id. ("An all-powerful cable company, for example, would be able to influ-
ence and control what Americans could watch or read by refusing to carry chan-
nels or certain Internet services, or it could favor its own content.").
241 Aviv NEVO, DEPUTY ASSISTANT Arr'Y GEN. FOR ECON. ANAYSIs, U.S. DEP'T OF
JUSTICE, MERGERS THAT INCREASE BARGAINING LEVERAGE 2 (Jan. 22, 2014), availa-
ble at http://wwNvjustice.gov/atr/public/speeches/303149.pdf, see also HORIZON-
TAL MERGER GUIDELINES, supra note 35, at 34-36.
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cause of Comcast's vertical integration,2 4 2 the merger will elimi-
nate the competition that currently exists between programmers
and Time Warner.
The argument that the cable companies do not directly com-
pete recalls similar claims made by AT&T Corporation in sup-
port of its attempt to acquire T-Mobile USA, to no avail. 24 4 The
DOJ has continually reaffirmed its action in blocking that pro-
posed merger.4 After abandoning the AT&T deal, which would
have increased the HHI by 700 points to a post-merger HHI of
3,100,246 T-Mobile has grown organically through "aggressive in-
vestment in its network and new pricing plans," so it now pro-
vides valuable competition in the national mobile wireless
telecommunications services market. 24 7
Finally, the lack of competition in the Comcast merger would
remove the incentive for the merged entity, which would con-
trol "19 of the 20 largest metropolitan areas in the country," to
improve to fiber-optic networks.2 4" This potential for diminished
investment illustrates a non-price effect of consolidation, the im-
pact of which is substantial in this industry. For example, a re-
cent Canadian study revealed technical advancements, and not
"scale economies," were the most significant contributor of total
productivity growth in the telecommunications sector.2 49
242 The company owns the largest distribution network and one of the largest
programmers and broadcasters. Warren Grimes, Competition Will Not Survive the




244 Kevin Roose, This Math Formula Shows Why the Comcast-Time Warner Cable Deal
Should Be Blocked, N.Y. MAc. (Feb. 13, 2014), http://nymag.com/daily/intelli-
gencer/2014/02/why-comcasttime-warner-cable-should-be-blocked.html.
245 See, e.g., Edward Wyatt, Wireless Mergers Will Draw Scrutiny, Antitrust Chief Says,
N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 30, 2014, at B3, available at http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2014/
01/30/wireless-mergers-will-draw-scrutiny-antitrust-chief-says ("We've seen the
benefits over the last two and a half years of four-firm competition. Experience
teaches us that the market is thriving and consumers are benefiting from the
current competitive dynamic.").
246 Second Amended Complaint at 13, United States v. AT&T, Inc., No. 1:11-
CV-01560, 2011 WL 4806971 (D.D.C. Sept. 30, 2011), ECF No. 39.
247 Wyatt, supra note 245.
248 See Crawford, supra note 238.
249 Wulong Gu & Amdlie Lafrance, Productivity Growth in the Canadian Broadcast-
ing and Telecommunications Industry: Evidence from Micro Data, STATISTICS CAN. 24
(Feb. 2014), available at http://www.statcan.gc.ca/pub/l1f0027m/11f0027m201
4089-eng.pdf.
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Thus, antitrust action is necessary to similarly preserve and
protect competition with respect to the cable merger. Like the
airline industry, the cable industry has struggled with profitabil-
ity250 and has undergone massive consolidation .25 However, the
success of T-Mobile suggests that restructuring and focusing on
organic growth can strengthen companies individually, without
having to resort to a merger. Thus, the enforcement agencies
should seek to block the Comcast and Time Warner merger to
promote organic growth and competition and investment in
technology. Alternatively, Comcast can divest its programming
business, at a minimum, to increase vertical competition, and
the Federal Communications Commission can promulgate regu-
lations to spur technological growth.
V. CONCLUSION
Despite the varied nature of the opinions and theories sur-
rounding merger enforcement generally and in the airline in-
dustry, a critical analysis of the impact of the US Airways and
American Airlines merger reveals the failure of the Antitrust Di-
vision of the DOJ to protect present and future competition by
allowing the creation of the world's largest airline.
Because of the shift in the development and interpretation of
merger enforcement from the judiciary to the enforcement
agencies, the enforcement agencies should be more vigilent in
protecting competition and should restrict future consolidation
of airlines. They should also learn from the US Airways and
American Airlines merger in considering proposed mergers in
other industries, such as the cable industry.
In conclusion, although a particular policy rationale may sup-
port the merger of competitors, antitrust law exists to protect
competition for the benefit of consumers-not to protect indi-
vidual competitors-and the enforcement agencies must act
consistently with this purpose.
250 See Popelka, supra note 238 (noting that "both companies are limping
along, victims of big changes in the television industry that may make them irrele-
vant within a decade").
251 See infra Part VI (comparing the consolidation of the airline industry in
Figure 1 with that of the cable industry in Figure 2). Compare Susan Carey et al.,
More Stable Airlines Fly Out ofMergers, WALL ST.J. (Feb. 11, 2013, 7:23 PM), http://
online.wsj.com/news/articles/SB100014241278873248805045782984435824546
84, with Rani Molla, Two Decades of Cable TV Consolidation, WALL ST. J. (Feb. 13,
2014, 10:48 AM), http://blogs.wsj.com/corporate-intelligence/2014/02/13/
chart-two-decades-of-cable-tv-consolidation.
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VI. APPENDIX
Figure 1
Flight Paths I Some major U.S. airline mergers since the industry was deregulated in 1978
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